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Abstract
Labor market theories that allow for search frictions make marked predic-
tions on the e®ect of the degree of frictions on wages. Often, the e®ect is
predicted to be negative. Despite the popularity of these theories, this has
never been tested. We perform tests with matched worker-¯rm data. We
e®ectively compare di®erent markets with di®erent degrees of frictions and
di®erent market outcomes. The worker data are informative on individual
wages and labor market transitions, and this allows for estimation of the
degree of search frictions. The ¯rm data are informative on labor produc-
tivity. The matched data allow for an assessment of the skill composition
in di®erent markets. Together this allows us to investigate how the mean
di®erence between labor productivity and wages in a market depends on
the degree of frictions and other determinants. Using within-market vari-
ation, we also investigate the extent of (and explanations for) positive
assortative matching. We perform separate analyses for The Netherlands
and Denmark.
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Agency.1 Introduction
Nowadays, a substantial amount of labor economics research takes account of
informational frictions or search frictions to understand economic behavior in
the labor market (see e.g. various chapters in Ashenfelter and Card, 1999). In
standard neo-classical labor market models, the equilibrium wage is determined
by equality of demand and supply. In equilibrium models with search frictions,
the situation is di®erent. The presence of frictions implies that there may be a
rent (or surplus) at the moment at which the employer and the worker meet. If
a contact does not result in a match then the worker's instantaneous utility °ow
remains at its previous level, and the ¯rm is left with the vacancy. Both parties
then have to search further for a partner. If a contact does result in a match then
a wage has to be determined. A wage e®ectively divides the rent of a match into
a portion for the employer and a portion for the worker. In general, the wage
level is a®ected by the market power of both parties, which in turn may depend
on the amount of frictions in the market. So, wage determination is a®ected by
the presence of search frictions.
The models that have been developed in the literature make marked predic-
tions on the e®ect of the degree of frictions on the mean equilibrium wage. Often,
the e®ect is predicted to be negative. Underlying reasons for this are that the
labor force is more or less ¯xed whereas ¯rms and vacancies can be created rela-
tively quickly, and each single worker can match with only one ¯rm whereas ¯rms
can match with many workers at the same time. If frictions decrease then ¯rms
bene¯t less because new ¯rms may enter the market, and because ¯rms may have
been constrained in their labor demand because of the frictions. For examples,
see the surveys in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Van den Berg (1999), Weiss
(1991), and Rogerson and Wright (2001). The predictions on the e®ect of frictions
on the mean wage are fundamental in the sense that they relate an indicator of
the amount of labor market imperfection to the equilibrium price in the market,
and as such this concerns the relevance of frictions. However, they has never been
tested.
This paper empirically investigates the e®ect of frictions on the mean wage,
using matched worker-¯rm data. The results are informative on the relevance of
frictions in general, and the speci¯cation of di®erent popular equilibrium search
models of the labor market (making di®erent predictions on the sign of the ef-
fect) in particular. In addition, the results have policy relevance. A popular way
to reduce the monopsony power that ¯rms derive from frictions is to impose a
minimum wage. This has as a negative side-e®ect that it may create structural
1unemployment. A subsidy on search e®ort may be considered as an alternative
policy to achieve an increase in the workers' share of the rent of the match. Fi-
nally, if frictions are important for wages, then they may also have e®ects on
other important variables, like ¯rms' capital investment (see e.g. Acemoglu and
Shimer, 2000).
To estimate the equilibrium e®ect, we compare di®erent market equilibria with
each other. In particular, we compare the mean wage across markets that have
di®erent search technologies. For such a comparison, it is necessary to control for
(the distribution of) characteristics of the ¯rms and the workers in a market. As
our measure of search frictions, we use the expected number of job o®ers in a spell
of employment (i.e., in between two spells of non-employment; a spell of employ-
ment may consist of multiple consecutive job spells). We argue that this measure
is less sensitive to considerations of reverse causality than a measure based on
unemployment durations or job o®ers during unemployment. The worker data
are informative on individual wages and tenures, and on worker characteristics,
and these data allow for estimation of the amount of search frictions in a mar-
ket without functional form assumptions. The ¯rm data are informative on the
distribution of labor productivity and wage costs in a market, and on ¯rm char-
acteristics. The matched data allow for an assessment of the skill composition in
di®erent markets. Together this allows us to investigate how the mean di®erence
between labor productivity and wages in a market depends on the degree of fric-
tions and other determinants. We use certain observed characteristics to de¯ne
di®erent labor markets. Such markets are supposed to contain all employees who
compete with each other for jobs.
The estimation results are used to decompose the wage variation across mar-
kets into a part due to cross-market di®erences in frictions and a part due to
productivity variation across markets. The latter can subsequently be decom-
posed into a part due to cross-market di®erences in the skill composition of the
workforce and cross-market di®erences in the ¯rms' productivity. By using indus-
try as a market characteristic, the results can be related to those in the literature
on inter-industry wage di®erentials (see e.g. Krueger and Summers, 1988, Gib-
bons and Katz, 1992 and Goux and Maurin, 1999). These studies do not examine
di®erences between labor market frictions as an explanation of these wage di®er-
entials.
We perform separate analyses for The Netherlands and Denmark. The recent
literature has shown that average frictions in the Dutch labor markets are in
between those of most continental European countries on the one hand and the
Anglo-Saxon countries on the other (Ridder and van den Berg, 1999), whereas
2the °exibility and the average amount of frictions in the Danish labor market are
in the same range as those in the U.S.. An advantage of the Danish data over
the Dutch data is that the former enable us to follow single individuals and ¯rms
over time whereas the latter are repeated cross-sections, with only retrospective
information on job mobility. In addition, the Danish data contain information on
all workers employed at a ¯rm if the ¯rm is in the sample, whereas the Dutch
data only have information on a sample of workers employed at ¯rms in the ¯rm
sample.
The wage variable of interest is the mean wage across ¯rms in a market rather
than across workers in that market. This is because workers self-select themselves
into high-wage ¯rms if frictions are low, but this is a partial (supply) e®ect and not
an equilibrium e®ect. The mean wage across workers may be negatively correlated
to the amount of frictions, but this does not necessarily imply that ¯rms take
frictions into account when they set wages.
It should be emphasized that we do not impose the structure of equilibrium
search models to the data, as has been done in previous studies (see the survey in
Van den Berg, 1999), although for each market we need to estimate the measure
of frictions in a market, which is a structural parameter. But the inference on
the impact of search frictions on the mean wage is made without an a priori
committal to any outcome.
Recently, a number of equilibrium models have been developed that allow for
heterogeneity of agent-speci¯c productivity at both sides of a given market, while
at the same time allowing for search frictions (like assignment models and models
that may generate assortative matching; see Shimer and Smith, 2000, Burdett and
Coles, 1999, and Shi, 2001). In such models, the equilibrium e®ect of frictions on
the mean wage is often not determined. Intuitively, this is because the mean wage
within a market strongly depends on the exact shape of the production function.
Our data enable us to address to what extent the equilibrium displays positive
assortative matching, i.e. to what extent high-productivity ¯rms team up with
high-productivity workers. For each ¯rm we can quantify the ¯rm-speci¯c pro-
ductivity component, and this can be used to calculate the correlation with the
fraction of high-skilled workers within the ¯rm. Obviously, a high correlation can
be due to positive assortative matching or to the fact that the labor markets for
high-skilled workers have less search frictions. We distinguish between these ex-
planations by examining whether markets where this correlation is high also have
certain relative amounts of search frictions for high-skilled and low-skilled work-
ers. If it turns out that inter-skill di®erences in frictions are empirically important
for positive assortative matching then the latter is partly due to supply behavior
3(self-selection), whereas otherwise it is due to demand behavior (production tech-
nology). So this enables us to perform another decomposition. In sum, whereas
we use between-market variation to examine the relation between frictions and
wages, we use within-market variation to examine assortative matching.
Our analysis is complementary to the analyses in Abowd, Kramarz and Mar-
golis (1999) and its o®springs. These studies do not address the role of frictions,
and they assume that mobility of individuals between ¯rms is unrelated to the
¯rm's characteristics, whereas we allow this mobility to be driven by di®erences
between the old and the new ¯rm. However, these studies allow for unobserved
individual-speci¯c productivity terms, whereas we only allow for individual het-
erogeneity across observable skills and other characteristics.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical
framework. Section 3 deals with the actual measure of frictions that we use in the
empirical analysis. The Dutch and Danish data are discussed in Section 4. Section
5 concerns the estimation and testing strategy. The results for The Netherlands
are in Section 6. Section 8 deals with the empirical analysis of assortative match-
ing. The results for Denmark are in Section 7. Section 9 concludes.
2 Theoretical considerations
2.1 The general framework
Consider a labor market with search frictions. It takes time and e®ort for an
employer and a worker to ¯nd each other. Opportunities to form a match arrive
at random time intervals. If an opportunity arrives it has to be decided whether
to take it or leave it. It is not known in advance when a potential partner will
be found or what are his properties and the properties of a match. If a contact
does not result in a match then the worker's instantaneous utility °ow remains
at its previous level, and the employer is left with the vacancy. Both parties then
have to search further for a partner. This implies that a rent (or surplus) may be
created at the moment at which the employer and the worker meet. If the rent is
negative then a contact does not result in a match. A wage contract e®ectively
divides the rent of a match into a portion for the employer and a portion for the
worker. The division re°ects the relative power of both parties.
One way to classify equilibrium search and matching models of the labor mar-
ket is to distinguish between wage posting models (where the employer posts or
sets the wage before he meets applicants), and wage bargaining models (where the
employer and the worker bargain over the wage; see Mortensen and Pissarides,
41999). This distinction is not relevant for our purposes. In bargaining models,
the equilibrium wage is a weighted average of the worker's and the employer's
minimum and maximum acceptable wage values, where the weight captures the
relative bargaining power of the parties, and the minimum and maximum ac-
ceptable wage values depend on the market opportunities, i.e. on the amount of
frictions. In wage posting models, employers act as monopsonists, and they take
account of the behavior of all other parties on the market when they determine
their optimal ex ante wage o®er. In addition, the wage should allow for pro¯table
production. Typically, the level of the wage o®er captures the relative market
power of the ¯rm, which depends on the amount of search frictions (see Van den
Berg and Ridder, 1998, for a more detailed exposition; see also below). In both
cases, the resulting wage is bounded by threshold values re°ecting outside options
of both parties, and the precise location of the wage in between these bounds re-
°ects their relative power. Thus, in both cases the wage level may depend on the
amount of frictions in the market.
What happens when the amount of frictions changes? The values of the outside
options of the employer and the worker may change, and the power balance
between the parties may change. For example, with lower frictions unemployed
workers ¯nd it easier to ¯nd a good alternative job o®er, so their outside option
has a higher value, which implies a higher threshold value (reservation wage).
However, it is intuitively clear that in a model where workers and employers are
fully symmetric, both parties bene¯t with the same amount from a decrease in
frictions, and the equilibrium wage may remain the same (this is demonstrated
formally later in this section). Still, as noted in the introduction, many models
in the literature market predict that the mean equilibrium wage decreases in
the amount of frictions (see for example the models in Burdett and Mortensen,
1998, Pissarides, 1990, Albrecht and Axell, 1984, Bontemps, Robin and Van den
Berg, 2000, Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2001, Abbring, 1999, and Acemoglu and
Shimer, 2000). All of these models allow for an asymmetry in the environments
of workers and employers, such that workers bene¯t more from a reduction in
frictions than employers do. As a result, the competitive wage in the limiting
case where frictions vanish exceeds the wage in case of frictions.
Let us examine this more closely at a general level. The most fundamental
di®erence between a worker and a ¯rm is that the former corresponds to a rela-
tively long-lived physical unit whereas the latter can expand and contract and can
be created and destroyed relatively quickly. When frictions decrease, the value
of creating a vacancy increases, and this may prompt an instantaneous in°ow
of new ¯rms. The latter mitigates the e®ect of the decrease in frictions on the
5¯rms, and as a result the ¯rms bene¯t less than the workers. So, entry and exit
of ¯rms creates an asymmetry in the e®ect of frictions on employers and workers.
Now suppose that ¯rms are quantity-constrained in their labor demand because
of search frictions. It would be pro¯table for them to expand, but the in°ow of
workers is not su±ciently high for that. When frictions decrease, the ¯rms ex-
pand. However, at the same time it is easier for the workers to leave a ¯rm and
move to another ¯rm, and this pushes up the wage.
In the next subsections we examine some speci¯c models to illustrate the
above mechanisms and to shape thoughts for the empirical analysis. It would be
beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the e®ect of frictions on wages in a
meta-model that incorporates all models previously derived in the literature.
2.2 The Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg model
We describe the equilibrium model developed by Bontemps, Robin and Van den
Berg (2000) in some detail, because some of the model parameters and expressions
are used later in this paper when we de¯ne the measure of frictions. Also, some
of the empirical speci¯cations can be motivated by this model. Finally, as a by-
product to the paper, we test some speci¯c predictions of this model. It should
be emphasized from the outset that the famous Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
model is a special case of this model.
The model considers a labor market consisting of ¯xed continuums m and n
of workers and ¯rms, respectively. The measure of unemployed workers is denoted
by u. The supply side of the model is equivalent to a standard partial job search
model with on-the-job search (see Mortensen, 1986). Workers obtain wage o®ers,
which are random drawings from the (endogenous) wage o®er distribution F(w),
at exogenous rates ¸0 when unemployed and ¸ when employed. Firms post wage
o®ers and they do not bargain over the wage. Layo®s accrue at the constant
exogenous rate ±.1 The opportunity cost of employment is denoted by b and is
assumed to be constant across individuals and to be inclusive of unemployment
bene¯ts and search costs. The optimal acceptance strategy for the unemployed is
then characterized by a reservation wage Á. Employed workers simply accept any
wage o®er that exceeds their current wage. In sum, workers climb the job ladder
to obtain higher wages, but this e®ort may be frustrated by a temporary spell of
frictional unemployment.
Now consider the °ows of workers. First, note that active ¯rms do not o®er a
1The separation rate ± can be interpreted to capture an idiosyncratic instantaneous large
decrease in the productivity of the worker in his current job.
6wage below Á, so that all wage o®ers will be acceptable for the unemployed. Let
the distribution of wages paid to a cross-section of employees have distribution
function G. These wages are on average higher than the wages o®ered, because
of the °ow of employees to better paying jobs. The stock of employees with a
wage less than or equal to w has measure G(w)(m ¡ u). The °ow into this stock
consists of unemployed who accept a wage less than or equal to w, and this °ow
is equal to ¸0F(w)u The °ow out of this stock consists of those who become
unemployed, ±G(w)(m ¡ u) and those who receive a job o®er that exceeds w,




± + ¸(1 ¡ F(w))
(1)
where we have substituted for u using the equilibrium condition that the °ows
between unemployment and employment are equal.
Now consider the employers' behavior. We examine a labor market with work-
ers who are fully homogeneous, and we assume that an employer pays the same
wage to all of its employees. The steady-state labor force of an employer who sets
a wage w is denoted by l(w). Somewhat loosely, this must equal the number of
workers earning w divided by the number of ¯rms paying w. One may therefore
express l(w) in terms of m;n;±;¸0;¸ and F. Now consider a ¯rm with a °ow
p of marginal revenue product generated by employing one worker. We assume
that p does not depend on the number of employees, i.e. we assume that the
production function is linear in employment. Occasionally we refer to p as the
(labor) productivity of this ¯rm. Each ¯rm sets a wage w so as to maximize its
steady-state pro¯t °ow
(p ¡ w)l(w)
given F and given the behavior of workers.
We assume that p is continuously distributed across ¯rms within the market.
It should be emphasized that p is a ¯rm characteristic and not a worker character-
istic. Dispersion of p can be rationalized as an equilibrium outcome by letting ex
ante homogeneous ¯rms choose their capital before production starts (Acemoglu
and Shimer, 2000, Robin and Roux, 1999). Alternatively, it may be the result of
di®erences in product market power or match-speci¯c capital (Mortensen, 2000).
If the ¯rms' pro¯t function is additive in worker types then without loss of gen-
erality a single ¯rm may employ di®erent worker types, and all results below are
7for a given worker type. The results at the ¯rm level can then be obtained by
simple aggregation.
We denote the distribution function of p across all ¯rms by ¡(p). The lower
bound of the support of ¡ is denoted by p and the mandatory minimum wage
in the market is denoted by w. We assume that the model parameters are such
that Á < w · p.2;3 In equilibrium, the pro¯t maximizing wage for a ¯rm of type
p de¯nes a mapping w = K(p),













with ¡ := 1¡¡, The distribution of wage o®ers is F(w) = ¡(K¡1(w)). Note that
a ¯rm always o®ers w < p.4




The mean wage across ¯rms equals the mean wage o®er, because all ¯rms always



















(1 ¡ ´2)¡(x) + ´2 + 2´
(´ + (1 ¡ ´)¡(x))2 dx
(3)
2The ¯rst inequality is in line with the empirical observation that within each labor market
some wages are at or close to the mandatory minimum wage. The inequality facilitates the
comparative statics analysis, because marginal changes in Á do not a®ect equilibrium wages.
Su±cient for the ¯rst inequality is that b < w and that ¸0 · ¸.
3For expositional reasons we do not address existence and multiplicity of equilibria; see Van
den Berg (2000).
4In equilibrium, ¯rms with a higher labor productivity o®er higher wages, have a larger
labor force and have higher pro¯t °ows. The model thus explains the ¯rm-size wage e®ect
and persistent inter-¯rm wage di®erentials. The model displays similarities to \turnover costs"
e±ciency wage models (see e.g. Stiglitz, 1985, and Weiss, 1991). See Ridder and Van den Berg
(1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) and Montgomery (1991) for overviews of the empirical
evidence supporting these types of models.
5These results are not in Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (2000).
8This provides a useful decomposition into three additive factors. The ¯rst
term 2
3E(p) + 1
3w is equal to the mean wage across ¯rms that prevails if ¸ = 1,
i.e. if there are no search frictions for the employed (see Van den Berg and
Ridder, 1998). In this limiting case, every unemployed individual who ¯nds a job
moves immediately to the job with the highest wage. This highest wage then
in turn converges to the highest productivity level. However, F converges to a
nondegenerate distribution. In the limit, pro¯ts are zero for the ¯rm o®ering this
highest wage as well as for the ¯rms o®ering a lower wage.
Without ¯rm heterogeneity, the mean wage o®er is equal to the sum of the ¯rst
and the second term. Thus, the second term in the decomposition of the mean
wage represents the change in the mean wage due to search frictions. It should be
emphasized that in this case wages are dispersed (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998)
so that workers do move between jobs. Taken together, the ¯rst and second term
are a weighted average of E(p) and w. The latter re°ect the threshold values or
outside options of both parties. The precise location of the wage in between these
bounds only depends on the frictional indicator ´. The second term is actually
always negative and it decreases in ´. This is the e®ect that we discussed in
the previous subsection. If ´ is small then the amount of frictions is low, so it
is easy for employed workers to ¯nd other job opportunities. Firms with high
productivity then have an incentive to o®er a relatively high wage, since that will
generate a larger in°ow of workers. Stated di®erently, it increases the workers'
market power and this pushes up the mean wage and reduces the pro¯t rate.6
The third term captures the component in the mean wage that is due to
heterogeneity of p. More precisely, it is non-zero if and only if both 0 < ¸ < 1
(so that 0 < ´ < 1) and var(p) > 0. So the third term is an interaction e®ect
between the indicator ¸ of frictions and an indicator of productivity dispersion
among ¯rms.7 If on-the-job search is impossible (i.e., ¸ = 0 so ´ = 1) then the
equilibrium wage satis¯es the \Diamond (1971) solution": w ´ w regardless of
whether ¯rms are heterogeneous or not.
In fact, with 0 < ¸ < 1 and var(p) > 0, this third term is always negative. So,
if ¯rm heterogeneity is introduced such that the mean productivity level remains
equal to the productivity level in the homogeneous model, then the mean wage
o®er is lower than in the homogeneous model. This can be understood as follows:
because of the wage °oor, the ¯rms with a low productivity all have to pay a wage
6More precisely, what happens to the pro¯t rate depends on whether ¸0 changes as well.
7The integral in the third term is similar to the Gini coe±cient of p, which can be shown to
equal
R 1
p ¡(p)¡(p)dp=E(p). The Gini coe±cient increases in a scale parameter of the distribu-
tion.
9close to their productivity level, and this pushes down all wages. As a by-product
of this paper, we test this empirically.
In the limiting competitive equilibrium solution, all workers are employed
at the ¯rm with the highest productivity in the market. The wage equals this
productivity level, and pro¯ts are zero. Consequently, in case of frictions, the
wage is below the competitive wage.
Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (2000) show that dK(p)=d¸ > 0 for all p
in the support of ¡. By implication, dEF(w)=d¸ > 0. Moreover, the monopsony
power index (p ¡ w)=w decreases in ¸. As noted above, all this is intuitively
plausible.
Let us return to the wages earned in a cross-section of workers at a par-
ticular moment. From equation (1) it follows that EG(w) > EF(w), and that
the di®erence between these means increases in ¸ given a certain F, so that
dEG(w)=d¸ > dEF(w)=d¸. This is of course the selection issue that we men-
tioned in Section 1. For EG(w) we obtain the following expression, with a similar
structure as (3),




´2 ¡ (1 ¡ ´)2¡(x)
¡
´ + (1 ¡ ´)¡(x)
¢2dx (4)
It follows that mean-preserving productivity dispersion among ¯rms can have a
positive or a negative e®ect on EG(w), depending on ¸ and on the particular
shape of the distribution ¡(p). If ¸ is very large then workers can move to high-
productivity ¯rms very fast, so it is advantageous for them to have high mean-
preserving productivity dispersion.
In two recent working papers, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2000, 2001) work out
a model in which it is possible to post worker-dependent wages. Moreover, they
assume that it is possible for a ¯rm to renegotiate on a wage when a worker
obtains a better outside option. It can be shown that the mean wage is the same
as above.
2.3 The Pissarides model
We start by listing the di®erences between the \prototype" Pissarides (1990)
model (see also Pissarides, 1984, 1986) and the model of the previous subsection.
In the Pissarides model, a ¯rm is equivalent to a single job task for a single
worker. Let v denote the measure of vacancies in the market. Then n¡v = m¡u
denotes the measure of ¯lled jobs. In addition, there is no search on the job, so
10¸ ´ 0. Workers and ¯rms are homogeneous. Note that from the point of view
of an employer the arrival rate of workers equals ¸0u=v. A ¯rm with an un¯lled
vacancy pays a vacancy cost °ow equal to cv.
A worker and an employer bargain over the wage whenever a match is con-
summated. The bargaining solution is the axiomatic Nash solution. This means
that the wage is determined such that the worker gets a fraction ¯ of the surplus
of the match. It is not di±cult to see that this implies that w is determined by8
¯
·
p ¡ w + cv
± + ¸0u=v
¸




for a given ¯xed measure of vacancies v. The threshold values or outside options
of both parties depend on the frictional indicators ¸0;u=v and ± and on monetary
°ows. The precise location of the wage in between these bounds depends on the
bargaining power indicator ¯.
In the prototype Pissarides model, the equilibrium value of v is determined
by a free entry condition for ¯rms. This states that the present value of having a
vacancy is equal to zero. It is not di±cult to see that this gives
(p ¡ w)¸0u=v = ±cv (6)
for a given wage level w. Substitution into (5) gives
w = p ¡
±
± + ¯¸0
(1 ¡ ¯)(p ¡ b) (7)
which is a weighted average of p and b. Obviously, this also equals EF(w) and
EG(w). Note the similarity between the right-hand side of equation (7) and the
¯rst two terms at the right-hand side of equation (4). If ¸0 < 1 then the wage is
smaller than if ¸0 = 1. However, some care should be taken here, since ¸0 is not
a structural parameter anymore. It depends on the market size by way of a con-
stant returns to scale matching function M(u;v). We write M(u;v) := ®M0(u;v),
where ® is a structural parameter denoting the e±ciency of the matching technol-
ogy.9 As such this is a better indicator of the amount of frictions than ¸0. There
8For expositional reasons we restrict attention to the limiting case in which the discount
rate is in¯nitesimally small (just as in the previous subsection). The results do not depend on
this.
9In the model of the previous subsection this would be irrelevant, as all agents search there.
11holds that ¸0 := M(u;v)=u = ®M0(1;v=u). By substituting this into equations










The derivative dw=d® captures the e®ect that we discussed in Subsection 2.1. If
® is large then the amount of frictions is low, so it is easy for workers to ¯nd a
job opportunity. This provides an incentive for ¯rms to create vacancies and for
new ¯rms to enter the market. This increases the workers' market power and this
pushes up the mean wage. The ¯rms' contact arrival rate also increases, but the
positive e®ect of this on the value of a vacancy is o®set by the wage increase.
2.4 Some other models
Let us return to the Pissarides model, but let us now assume that the number
of ¯rms (and, therefore, vacancies) is ¯xed. This case is examined by Pissarides
(1984). We assume that n = m so that v = u: the number of ¯lled and un¯lled
jobs equals the labor force size. Equation (5), which describes w for a given
amount of vacancies, now reduces to
w = ¯(p + cv) + (1 ¡ ¯)b
This does not depend on the amount of frictions in the market. By making the
model completely symmetric between workers and employers, each party bene¯ts
with equal amount from a reduction in frictions, and the wage is not a®ected.
This highlights the importance in the previous subsections of the assumption that
labor supply is less elastic than labor demand, in response to a change in search
frictions. From an empirical point of view, this assumption certainly seems more
reasonable than its opposite.
Now let us brie°y examine a model in which frictions actually increase the
mean wage. The results for the Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (2000) model
depend on the production technology being such that it is always pro¯table for
¯rms to expand if possible. Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) examine an equi-
librium search model with decreasing returns to scale in labor such that ¯rms
do not want to expand inde¯nitely. In addition, the measure of ¯rms is ¯xed.
The search intensity of workers is endogenous. If frictions decrease then, at the
going wage, the in°ow of potential workers at a ¯rm exceeds the out°ow. When
employers reduce the wage, the unemployed workers' search intensity decreases.
12Each employer is therefore able to reduce the wage until the in°ow is just enough
to maintain its optimal labor force. In sum, search frictions and wages are posi-
tively related, and the competitive wage is below the equilibrium wage in case of
frictions.
Finally, recall from the introduction that in models with two-sided produc-
tivity heterogeneity and search frictions, the equilibrium e®ect of frictions on the
mean wage is sometimes hard to derive or is not determined. In general, the mean
total productivity across ¯rms within a market depends on the skill distribution
across ¯rms and on the labor market tightness. At one extreme, in a market
without frictions, the matching between workers and ¯rms is positive assorta-
tive in the sense that there is a positive deterministic equilibrium relationship
between skill level and ¯rm-speci¯c productivity (provided that the production
function has certain properties). At the other extreme, in a market with a very
large amount of frictions, the equilibrium is often pooled: all agents are willing
to match will all agents at the other side of the market. In both cases, the mean
wage strongly depends on the productivity of the matches that can be formed.
We return to assortative matching in Section 8.
2.5 Reverse causality
The models considered in Subsection 2.2 and 2.3 suggest the use of ¸ and ¸0 (or
expressions that depend on these) as measures of friction. For a parameter to be
a sensible measure of frictions, it has to be a fundamental market characteristic
that does not depend on wages or their distribution. In reality, it is conceivable
that wages a®ect the individual job o®er arrival rate by way of the e®ort that the
individual decides to spend on search. As in the Burdett and Vishwanath (1998)
model, if wages are high then the unemployed worker's optimal search intensity
is high. This creates a positive causal e®ect from the mean wage to ¸0. This
in turn creates a negative relation between the mean wage and the amount of
frictions as captured by ¸0. An empirical analysis on this relation may therefore
have di±culties in identifying the causal e®ect of frictions on wages.
We now argue that this issue is less problematic if we use a measure of frictions
based on the job o®er arrival rate for employed workers. If there is no wage
dispersion then the optimal search intensity for employed workers is zero (see
e.g. Albrecht, Holmlund and Lang, 1991), irrespective of the actual wage level. If
the wage variance is positive then the optimal search intensity for an employed
worker may be positive. Whether it depends on the wage depends on the way
in which direct (utility equivalents of) search costs depend on the current wage.
13If they decrease in the current wage then the optimal search intensity may be a
constant. Remember, however, that we are only interested in market averages.
In general, the mean search intensity and the resulting average arrival rate are
very sensitive to the wage variance but not to the mean wage. Intuitively, this is
because a change in the mean wage also a®ects the relative income position of the
average employed searcher. For unemployed searchers, the situation is di®erent:
if the mean wage increases then the gap with the instantaneous income °ow
increases, and this increases the search intensity.
3 Measure of frictions
To measure the amount of frictions in a market, we focus on the ease with which
workers can make job-to-job transitions. This is inspired by the equilibrium mod-
els that allow for on-the-job search. Speci¯cally, in the notation of the Bontemps,
Robin and Van den Berg (2000) model, we use ¸ and ¸=± as our measure or




Note that this is related to ´ de¯ned above by way of ´ = 1=(1 + k). The higher
¸ is, the easier it is to ¯nd another job. The measure k equals the mean number
of job o®ers in a spell of employment, which may cover multiple consecutive job
spells. It equals the rate at which job opportunities arise as a fraction of the rate
at which they are needed. In other words, it is informative on the speed at which
workers can climb the job ladder.
In many equilibrium models, the parameter k is an indicator of the rela-
tive power of workers vis-µ a-vis employers. This is obvious in the Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) model and its spin-o®s. Note also that in all of those equilib-
rium models, the wage distributions F and G and their means depend on ¸ only
by way of k.
In empirical studies, the estimates of ¸ and k are often positively correlated
across markets with the estimate of ¸0 (see e.g. Ridder and Van den Berg, 1997).
Therefore, ¸ and k may also capture the amount of frictions for the unemployed.
However, as noted in Subsection 2.5, the use of ¸ and k is less sensitive to reverse
causality problems than the use of ¸0.
Since we exploit cross-market variation to study the e®ect of frictions on
wages, it is natural to ask what drives cross-market variation in ¸. One may
14think of at least three factors. First, by relating ¸ to an aggregate matching
function (as in Subsection 2.3) it becomes clear that ¸ depends on the number of
agents on both sides of the market. Secondly, it may depend on the availability
of institutions that facilitate meeting agents from the other side of the market.
Related to this, it may depend on the agents' private search costs. Thirdly, it may
depend on product market turbulence. To the extent that these determinants
di®er across markets, ¸ also di®ers across markets (see Amable and Gatti, 2001,
for a recent overview of empirical evidence on this).
4 The Dutch and Danish data
4.1 The Dutch data
For the years 1993 and 1994, we have access to two survey data sets of Statis-
tics Netherlands: the Production Survey and the Wage and Employment Survey.
Firms are legally obliged to respond and give su±cient answers to the di®erent
questions of these surveys when sampled.
In the Production Survey (PS), all manufacturing ¯rms with 20 or more em-
ployees are surveyed and a sample is drawn from the ¯rms with less than 20
employees. The total number of sampled ¯rms is about 6000 per year. Many
¯rms are present in both years. We use information on the registration number of
the ¯rm, the industry type, the ¯rm size (labor force), the revenue product, the
wage costs, and the depreciation costs of the ¯rm. We now examine the variables
in more detail.
The registration number of the ¯rm is a unique identi¯er. The industry type
(or sector) of the ¯rm is based on the ¯rst two digits of the 1993 Standard Industry
Classi¯cation (SIC). The PS data contain ¯rms in the manufacturing industry
with 2-digit SIC numbers ranging from 15 to 37. We delete the ¯rms of the tobacco
industry and the recycling industry because these are very small industries with
characteristics that deviate a lot from the other industries. The remaining 21
industries are: Food / Textiles / Wearing apparel / Leather / Products of wood
/ Pulp and paper / Publishing / Re¯ned petroleum / Chemicals / Rubber and
plastic / Other non-metallic / Basic metals / Fabricated metal / Machinery /
O±ce machinery / Electrical machinery / Radio, tv / Medical instruments /
Motor vehicles / Other transport / Furniture.
Firm size is the number of individuals who were working in the ¯rm at the
end of September of the year of observation. Total value added of the ¯rm is the
total sales of the ¯rm minus the monetary value of all purchases. Corrections are
15made for °uctuations in the stock of primary goods. The ¯rm's productivity level
is de¯ned as the total value added divided by ¯rm size. Total wage costs of the
¯rm concern the total wage bill of the ¯rm. It includes wage and labor taxes and
social security payments for both employers and employees. Finally, depreciation
costs are the depreciation costs as they appear on the ¯rms' balance sheets. They
are roughly equal to a ¯xed percentage of the historical price of the ¯xed assets.
The Wage and Employment Survey (WES) is based on a two-stage sample
design. Statistics Netherlands takes a sample of ¯rms to ask questions about total
employment of the ¯rm in the ¯rst stage. The sample is not random but takes
account of ¯rm size. All ¯rms with 20 or more employees are drawn, while a
sample is taken from the ¯rms with less than 20 employees. The latter sample
is purely random and does not depend on ¯rm size. The sample in this second
stage is a subsample of the ultimate sample of the ¯rst stage. All ¯rms with 100
or more employees are drawn, while a sample is taken of the ¯rms with less than
100 employees. Additionally, the number of employees being sampled within the
¯rm depends on ¯rm size as well. Firms with less than 20 employees provide data
for all employees, while ¯rms with 20 or more employees provide data for only
a fraction of their employees. This fraction depends again on the ¯rm size and
varies from 7 to 50 percent. The actual percentage decreases in the number of
employees. The total number of individuals in the WES is about 78,000 per year.
The probability of an individual worker being sampled within the WES is
equal to the probability that the ¯rm is sampled, multiplied by the probability
that the individual worker is sampled, given that the ¯rm is sampled. The ¯rst
term of the product is decreasing with ¯rm size and the second is increasing with
¯rm size. We take account of this sampling device in our empirical implementa-
tion.
We use variables from the WES concerning the registration number of the
¯rm, the 2-digit SIC number of the ¯rm, the ¯rm size, the city of the ¯rm's head
o±ce, the worker's tenure, the worker's hourly wage, and the worker's skill level
(high or low). The registration number of the ¯rm and the ¯rm size are de¯ned
as in the PS. The city where the ¯rm's head o±ce is situated is used to create
regional indicators for the following 7 regions: (1) north, (2) east, (3) center, (4)
northern west coast, (5) southern west coast, (6) south, and (7) southeast. These
regions are depicted in Figure 1.
The worker's hourly wage includes extra payments for overtime hours. This
is the gross wage, including wage taxes and social security payments for the
employee, but excluding the wage and labor taxes and social security payments
that are borne by the employer. The occupational classi¯cation for the worker is
16Figure 1: Regional classi¯cation of The Netherlands as used in the empirical
analysis.
not based on the International Standard of Occupation Classi¯cation, but is based
on a question about the worker's main activities in the job. Statistics Netherlands
classi¯es the answers that were given into 19 categories. We reduce this to two
levels: high skilled and low skilled. The ¯rst applies to workers with at least a
master's degree as well as workers with an administrative job and managers. The
second applies to jobs that do not require special skills. Finally, the tenure is
measured by way of the year in which the worker started in his current job.
Table 1 lists some descriptive statistics of the most important variables for
the years 1993 and 1994.
One of the drawbacks of the data set used for the ¯rst two years of analysis
is the relative lack of information on the characteristics of the worker. Addition-
ally, the original setup of the Wage and Employment Survey ended in 1994 and
a new survey started in 1995 with even less information on worker characteris-
tics.10 Since this type of information is essential for our analysis, we use another
data set to obtain information of the workers for the years 1995 to 1997. This
data set is the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES). This data set is created by
10For example, the question about the skills of the labor force was deleted from the WES in
1995.
17Variable Mean value
Wage and Employment Survey
Hourly wage (guilders) 24.35
(10.10)
Tenure (elapsed job duration; months) 148.08
(111.69)
High skilled (fraction) 0.45
Production Survey
Productivity (1000 guilders per year) 114.21
(84.63)
Wage costs (1000 guilders per year) 69.01
(15.92)
Wage °oor (1000 guilders per year) 31.04
(1.20)
Table 1: Summary statistics for the PS and WES data, averaged over 1993 and
1994 (The Netherlands).
matching three data sources: the (new) Wage and Employment Survey (WES),
the Register System of the Social Security Funds (RSS) and the Dutch Labor
Force Survey (LFS). The records of the WES and the RSS are matched with the
LFS on the variables address, postal code, city, date of birth and gender. Only
the records from the RSS that match with the LFS are considered for inclusion
in the SES data set. Some observations of the data set are imputed by Statistics
Netherlands. The number of observations is only around 22,000 for individuals
working in the manufacturing industry. This is considerably lower than the num-
ber of observations in the original Wage and Employment Survey. More details
about the SES data set can be found in Schulte Nordholt (1998).
We use the following variables. Like in the WES data, we have the registration
number of the ¯rm, the 2-digit SIC number of the ¯rm, the city where the ¯rm's
head o±ce is situated, and the hourly wage including extra payments for overtime
hours. The tenure variable is in months, so it is more precise than in the old
WES. We also use variables on gender and level the education, based on the
highest level of education obtained from the International Standard Classi¯cation
of Education.
Table 2 summarizes statistics on the most important variables of the data
set. We emphasize that this data set is particularly useful when we look at the
18impact of worker characteristics on labor market frictions and its relation with
o®ered wages. We use the PS data of 1995 to 1997 merge with the SES data.
The number of ¯rm observations is around 4000. The reduction of observations
compared to earlier years is a result of a smaller subsample of ¯rms with less
than 20 employees.
4.2 The Danish data
We use the Pay and Performance data set for Denmark. This is a part of the
Integrated Database for Labour Market Research (IDA). The Danish Bureau of
Statistics has collected the data from a variety of sources used in the production
of o±cial statistics. The data set is all-encompassing, all Danish establishments
and all Danish residents are included. The information is on a yearly basis, from
1980 to 1995. For our analysis, data from all Danish citizens is matched with
information on the establishments to which they were a±liated each year.
A speci¯c feature of the data set is that it enables us to group workers as
employees at a speci¯c establishment, while the labor market history of a worker
can be described by a sequence of establishments. The labor market status, in-
cluding establishment a±liation, for each person is evaluated at a speci¯c date
in November. The matching of establishments and workers is possible because
establishments on an annual basis report the income of each employee, who is
identi¯ed by his or her \personnummer" (personal number). This is a numeric
code that each Dane is given at birth and which is the registration number for
individuals in all governmental (and many private) databases. When information
is collected for statistical purposes, the \personnummers" are used as identi¯ers,
which enables the Danish Bureau of Statistics to match information from di®erent
sources.
An establishment is basically a production unit at a speci¯c location and
information on the market is limited to a detailed industrial code. In the con-
struction of the database considerable attention has been paid to cases where
establishments have moved or undergone other major changes. For example, if
most workers at an establishment move to another physical location and the
owner and industrial code for those workers are unchanged, then the establish-
ment is considered a continuing establishment with another physical location.
Attrition of individual persons is for all practical purposes not present in IDA,
the Danish Bureau of Statistics keeps track of every single Danish resident and
assigns him or her one and only labor market state and establishment in each
year.
19Variable Mean






No completed primary education 0.009
Only primary education 0.113
Lower secondary education 0.275








Northern west coast 0.110
Southern west coast 0.142
South 0.262
Southeast 0.117
Number of individuals 21716
Table 2: Summary statistics for the SES data (The Netherlands).
20The ¯rst set of variables that we use is related to individual worker informa-
tion. This includes the worker, ¯rm, and establishment identi¯ers, and informa-
tion on occupation, level of education, sector, residence, labor market state, and
earnings. The ¯rm identi¯er changes over time when the ownership of the ¯rm
changes or when it changes location. Recall that the establishment identi¯er does
not necessarily change at such instances.
There are six di®erent occupation types: CEO, high-level management, low-
level management, o±ce worker, skilled blue collar worker and unskilled blue
collar worker. Based on the type and years of education, we distinguish 10 ed-
ucation levels: (1) less than 7 years of primary schooling, (2) between 7 and 8
years of primary schooling, (3) between 8 and 9 years of primary schooling, (4)
between 9 and 10 years of primary schooling, (5) high school, (6) apprentice-
ship, (7) public exam, (8) short education, (9) bachelors degree and (10) masters
degree. It was not possible to obtain an accurate measure of the eduction level
for all workers. We deleted these individuals when education level is taken into
account for the analysis. The sector classi¯cation of the ¯rm is based on the 1993
Standard Industry Classi¯cation (SIC). The place of residence gives one of the
276 cities (kommune). We aggregate this into regions (amt). The yearly earnings
concern the job held at November, 1st.
We exclude individuals who were self-employed, out of the labor force or work-
ing for the public sector for some years between 1980 and 1995. It is likely that
the behavior of such individuals, at least in a certain period, deviates substan-
tially from the behavior that the model intends to describe. Moreover, we delete
individuals who work in the industries agriculture, ¯shery, mining, ¯nancial ser-
vices, education and medical services. These industries do not have information
about ¯rms and therefore inclusion of individuals who work in these industries
does not add anything to our analysis.
The total number of observations in our data set is equal to 612,701 obser-
vations when we do not include education levels in our analysis. The number of
observations is equal to 533,628 when we take this into account.
Table 3 lists the descriptives of the main variables of the data set. The ¯rst
column describes the raw data set. The second column describes our sample
before we created the education levels. The ¯nal columns describes our sample
after deleting the observations without an accurate education level. We ¯nd that
around half of the Danes only have primary education. This ¯gure is much higher
as was found from the Dutch data set. However, primary education in the Nether-
lands is only six years instead of up to ten years in Denmark. Moreover, we ¯nd
that almost one third of the Danes live in Copenhagen. The second largest urban
21area is º Arhus, where around 10% of all Danes are living.
The second set of variables contains the business statistics of the ¯rms. Only
¯rms that have over 20 employees are included. There are observations for the
years 1992 to 1997. The variables are basically the same as in the Dutch PS
data. Speci¯cally, we have the ¯rm identi¯er, the total wage costs, the total value
added, the ¯rm size in November, both in number of employees and in number
of full time equivalents (fte), and we have the value of the ¯xed assets.
Both the productivity level per worker and the wage costs per worker can be
measured in either the physical unit or the number of full time equivalents. Note
that both are averages for the whole company. Using the data from the individual
workers, it is also possible to obtain wage costs per worker type. This can be done
by taking the sum of earnings in the November job over all individuals with this
type who are working in the ¯rm in November. Table 4 summarizes the descriptive
statistics for the business statistics of the ¯rms.
There are two important di®erences between this data set and the Dutch data
set. First, the Danish data set is a register based data set, while the data set for
The Netherlands is based on a survey. The former can be expected to have a
higher level of accuracy. A second important di®erence is the panel structure of
the Danish data set. Since every Dane that ever worked in the private sector
between 1980 and 1995 is in the data set, it is possible to follow these individuals
over time. We use this in our empirical implementation. A third di®erence is that
for each ¯rm the Danish data contain records for all of its workers.
5 Estimation strategy
5.1 Identi¯cation of labor markets
The empirical analysis is based on a comparison of di®erent markets. We there-
fore have to decide on a segmentation of the total labor market into unrelated
(sub)markets. Initially, we assume that workers are homogeneous within a market
and that a ¯rm can only be active in one market, and we require that we can
identify (i.e., observe the de¯ning characteristics of) the market to which ¯rms in
the PS data belong. This is convenient because we only observe the total value
added by a ¯rm, and not the separate contributions to this by employees who
may belong to di®erent labor markets. We therefore assume that markets are
de¯ned by industry sector and region. We distinguish between 20 industries and
7 regions. We omit markets with less than 6 ¯rms in the PS data or less than 26
workers in the WES data. This gives 66 di®erent markets. For later purposes it is
22Variable Original Homogenous Heterogenous
workers workers
Education levels
Less than 7 years of primary education { { 0.154
8 years of primary education { { 0.039
9 years of primary education { { 0.344
10 years primary education { { 0.159
Highschool { { 0.153
Apprenticeship { { 0.326
Public exam { { 0.014
Short education { { 0.033
Bachelors degree { { 0.026
Masters degree { { 0.004
Regions
Copenhagen 0.303 0.286 0.282
Roskilde 0.046 0.048 0.048
Vestj½lland 0.054 0.054 0.054
Storstrom 0.046 0.049 0.048
Fyn 0.008 0.008 0.008
Bornholms 0.087 0.088 0.088
Sonderjylland 0.047 0.051 0.051
Ribe 0.042 0.044 0.044
Vejle 0.065 0.072 0.073
Ringkoping 0.053 0.056 0.056
º Arhus 0.119 0.112 0.114
Viborg 0.042 0.043 0.044
Nordjylland 0.089 0.091 0.092
Total number of observations 2870756 612701 533628
Table 3: Summary statistics for the individuals data set (Denmark).
23Variable Mean
Overall ¯rm characteristics
Average ¯rm size 86.2
(276.0)
Average ¯rm size (fte) 72.1
(229.2)
Wage costs (x1000)a 200.37
(132.95)




Productivity (fte) (x1000)a 482.13
(1338)
Fixed assets per worker (x1000)a 253.72
(988.79)
















Table 4: Summary statistics for the ¯rms' data set (Denmark).
aIn Danish Kroner per year
24relevant to point out that we remove those ¯rms from the data that do not have
workers who participated in the WES, because we cannot assign a region to such
¯rms.
There are several reasons for why this characterization of what constitutes
a separate labor market may be incorrect. First, each of these markets contains
workers with di®erent skill levels, and the sector and region speci¯c labor market
for high-skilled workers may be separated from (or have di®erent determinants
than) the sector and region speci¯c market for low-skilled workers. In Subsection
5.4 we develop and apply methods that allow for this. These exploit information
on the composition of the labor force within markets.
Secondly, workers may not be attached to a speci¯c industry sector. Since our
data set is based on repeated cross sections of workers, it cannot be used to observe
the numbers of workers who change industry over time. Instead, we use the Dutch
Social Economic Panel (SEP) of Statistics Netherlands to investigate this. The
SEP is a longitudinal panel survey of around 5000 families in The Netherlands. It
started in 1984. Participants were interviewed twice a year until 1990. Since then,
interviews are once a year. All members of the household who are 16 years or older
are surveyed about their educational attainment, labor market behavior, income
and wealth. In 1984, 3744 participants provided a valid response on the question
concerning their industry sector. In 19% of these cases this is the manufacturing
industry. When we follow this last group of workers over time, we ¯nd that in
1989 around 76% of them worked in a ¯rm with the same 2-digit SIC code as
the ¯rm they worked for in 1984. For 1994 this reduces to 68%. It is di±cult to
obtain a very clear picture from these ¯gures, because they include workers who
did not change jobs at all. At most, they give an indication of the attachment to
a particular industry. We are not able to identify the residence or the workplace
of the respondents and therefore we are not able to investigate the attachment
to the region.
In Denmark we distinguish more regions than in The Netherlands. This is
justi¯ed by the geographical structure of Denmark, with many islands.
5.2 Estimation of the measure of frictions
The empirical analysis consists of two steps. In the ¯rst step, the measure of
frictions is estimated for each market, using in the case of The Netherlands the
WES data on individual wages and tenures.
Consider an on-the-job search model (recall that this describes the behavior
of employed workers in the model of Subsection 2.2 and many equilibrium search
25models). For a job with a given time-invariant wage w, the exit rate out of the
present job equals
µ = ± + ¸(1 ¡ F(w)) (8)
This is the hazard rate of the distribution of the duration an individual spends in
a job given the wage w. As a result, the duration of a job with a given wage w has
an exponential distribution with this parameter µ.11 Ridder and Van den Berg
(1999) show that the tenure (i.e. the elapsed job duration at the survey date),
given the current wage, also has an exponential distribution with parameter µ,
provided that two additional conditions are met: worker °ows are in a steady
state, and unemployed workers accept all wage o®ers. As discussed in Subsection
2.2, the latter is satis¯ed in equilibrium if workers are homogeneous or if the
workers' reservation wages are below the wage °oor in the market. Also, as we
have seen in Subsection 2.2, under the two additional conditions, there is a simple
relation between the wage o®er distribution F(w) and the distribution G(w) of
wages in a sample of currently employed workers. Consequently, the joint density
of a worker's wage and tenure at the survey date can be expressed in terms of
¸;± and G.
For the years 1993 and 1994, the distribution of G within a market is estimated








where the wi's are the observed wages and the si's are the weights for the obser-
vations in the market under consideration. These weights are obtained by using
information about the exact way in which the data is sampled. More precisely,
the relative weights should be equal to 1 divided by the probability that an in-
dividual employee is sampled.12 From the discussion of the previous paragraph,
we know that the probability that an individual employee is sampled is equal to
the probability that the ¯rm is sampled multiplied by the probability that the
worker is sampled from the ¯le of the ¯rm.
11In reality, making a job-to-job transition may involve costs. The empirical analysis in Van
den Berg (1992) shows that these costs are only a minor determinant of the optimal strategy,
and that they only have a small e®ect on µ.
12We have to divide by the total sum of these weights to guarantee that the weights sum up
to one.
26The log likelihood function for ¸ and ± within a market is based on the




¡(± + ¸F(wi))ti + log(± + ¸F(wi))
where F := 1 ¡ F can be expressed in terms of G;± and ¸, and where ti denotes
the tenure of individual i in the market under consideration. We have to take
account of the fact that we only observe the year in which the employee started
to work for his ¯rm, so we have to aggregate over time intervals. Estimates of
¸ and ± are obtained by maximization of this likelihood. One may argue that
the likelihood does not take account of the earnings distribution G and the exact
way in which workers and ¯rms are sampled. However, it is possible to show that
taking this into account only adds terms that are dependent on G but not on ¸
or ±.
With the Danish data, the estimation of the transition parameters is some-
what di®erent. We use the panel structure of the data set by following individuals
over the time period 1992 to 1994. In these years, we observe the employment
status of this individual (i.e. employed or unemployed) and when employed, we
are able to identify the establishment of this individual. We make the assumption
that individuals change job whenever their establishment changes. This requires
some discussion, as the empirical analyses in the second stage are based on ¯rm
data instead of establishment data. However, as mentioned in Subsection 4.2,
¯rm identi¯ers may change from year to year even when the ¯rm remains essen-
tially the same. This makes it di±cult to establish whether an individual makes
a transition on the basis of these identi¯ers. To the extent that workers make
transitions between establishments within a ¯rm, the relevant ¸ from the ¯rm's
point of view will be over-estimated. If such a bias has similar magnitude across
markets then the empirical analyses in the second stage are not a®ected.
Based on the above information, it is possible to distinguish thirteen di®erent
employment histories. For example, an individual can be observed to be employed
in 1992, employed in another establishment in 1993 and unemployed in 1994. The
probabilities of these complete histories are dependent on the probabilities of the
initial states, employment and unemployment. These are equal to ¸0=(±+¸0) and
±=(± + ¸0). In addition, the probabilities of complete histories are dependent on
the distributions of the duration of an unemployment spell and a job spell. These
are both exponential with parameters equal to ¸0 and ±+¸F(w). We do not have
any information on the exact transition date or on the new wage. This implies
27that we have to integrate over the conditional distributions of the durations of
the unemployment and job spells. We demonstrate this procedure in Appendix
1 to this paper.13 To obtain the likelihood equation, we de¯ne Pi(¸0;¸;±) as the
probability that an individual is in state i and let Ni be the number of individuals





Note that ¸0 is a nuisance parameter here. Also note that the number of
computations to calculate the likelihood does not increase with sample size. Based
on the fact that we have over half a million observations, this is a very convenient
property. Also note that the results for Denmark can be expected to be less
sensitive to the assumption that the labor markets are in stead state than the
Dutch results, which are solely based on retrospective tenures.
If we allow for skill heterogeneity, then we require measures of frictions for
each combination of industry sector, region, and skill level. In both the Dutch and
the Danish data, the number of sampled individuals in a given market can then
be too small to estimate the frictional parameters separately for each market.
In that case we take the log frictional parameters to be additive in industry,
regional, and skill e®ects (e.g., ¸ ´ x0¯¸), and we estimate them simultaneously
for all markets.
In case of the Dutch data, a small number of observations per market also com-
plicates the non-parametric estimation of G. We therefore take a semi-parametric
approach when we use the SES data to allow for detailed skill heterogeneity.
Speci¯cally, we specify F along the lines of Gallant and Nychka (1987) as a Her-
mite series (see Gabler, Laisney and Lechner, 1993, Koning, Van den Berg and
Ridder, 2000, and Van der Klaauw and Koning, 2001, for other applications). We
















13The procedure has been used before by Koning et al. (2000). They analyze the Danish
individual data by regressing the mean earned wage on friction indicators. They do not have
¯rm data, and they examine the mean wage across workers instead of ¯rms. Bunzel et al. (2000)
also use the Danish individuals data to estimate frictional parameters, as part of the structural
estimation of a speci¯c equilibrium search model.
28where K is an integer and S is simply a normalizing constant. Additionally,
®0 = ¼¡1=4, ®1 is chosen such that E(²) = 0, and ®i;i = 2;:::K and ° are
parameters to be estimated. A very wide range of shapes can be obtained for
h(²) even when K is not very high. In this case, log¹ is also taken to be additive
in the three market identi¯ers x.
The SES data contain elapsed job durations in months, so we do not have to
aggregate the likelihood function over yearly time intervals.
5.3 Estimation of the mean-wage regression without skill
heterogeneity
The endogenous variable of interest is the mean wage across ¯rms in a market
EF(w). Let indices i and k denote the market i and the ¯rm k. The endogenous
variable is then denoted by Ek(wik) and the explanatory variables are Ek(pik),
log´i and the wage °oor wi in market i. The wage °oor is the maximum of the
national minimum wage and the sector-speci¯c minimum wage. Both Ek(wik) and
Ek(pik) are obtained from the ¯rm data (wage costs and average revenue product
averaged over the two years for each market).
The basic speci¯cation of the regression equation is:
Ek(wik) = ®0 + ®1Ek(pik) + ®2wi + ®3 log´i + "i (9)
The parameter of interest is ®3, and we test whether it is negative. Speci¯ca-
tion (9) is ad hoc (or \reduced-form"). To some extent it can be motivated by
mean wage equations in the theoretical frameworks of Section 2. It should be
emphasized that we also estimate other speci¯cations. For example, we allow for
interactions of Ek(pik) and the measure of frictions, and we separately allow for
¸i and ±i (instead of only by way of ´i).
In the regression, the unit of observation is a market rather than an individual
¯rm. This means that the number of observations equals the number of markets
instead of the much larger number of ¯rms. However, note that we are only
interested in the determinants of the mean wage. Moreover, our speci¯cation is
less sensitive to the impact of measurement and speci¯cation errors. In particular,
our method is insensitive to heteroskedasticity due to intra-sector heterogeneity
of ¯rms.
The regression is non-standard in the sense that its variables Ek(wik);Ek(pik);
and ´i are estimated instead of observed (albeit they are estimated from very
29large samples). We take this into account when we estimate the standard devia-
tions of the regression parameters. Appendix 1 to this paper explains a method
to estimate the standard deviations of ¸ and ± when we use a non-parametric
distribution of G. The standard deviations of the regression estimates are derived
by using the delta method. We also estimate standard errors using bootstrapping.
5.4 Estimation of the mean-wage regression with skill het-
erogeneity
Within each market as de¯ned in the previous section, ¯rms employ workers
with di®erent skills j. If high skilled workers face a di®erent amount of frictions,
a di®erent wage determination process, or a di®erent wage °oor than low skilled
workers, then the above results are biased. To proceed, we may subdivide each
labor market as de¯ned above into di®erent markets, one for every skill level.
To facilitate the analysis, we assume that ¯rm production is additive in the
production by skill group within the ¯rm. Also, the subdivision into markets
should not have an e®ect on the choice of agents to participate in a certain market,
so that the skill distribution across markets is exogenous to wage determination.
As a result, the markets by skill level do not a®ect each other at all.
To see the bias involved, consider the mean wage regression equation for
market14 i;j, speci¯ed analogously to equation (9),
Ek(wijk) = ®0j + ®1jEk(pijk) + ®2jwij + ®3j log´ij + "ij (10)
Let us take the average over j. If ®sj ´ ®s(s = 0;1;2;3) then this gives,
Ek(wik) = ®0 + ®1Ek(pik) + ®2Ej(wij) + ®3Ej(log´ij) + "i
For the aggregated version of (10) to reduce to equation (9) we need the following
three assumptions to hold true. First, ®sj ´ ®s(s = 0;1;2;3), which basically
means that the wage policies are the same for all skills. Secondly, wi ´ Ej(wij).
This is unlikely to be true since in the data wi = minjfwijg. Thirdly, the amount
of frictions log´ij is the same for all skill groups (otherwise the ´i estimates are
biased). As we shall see, the data refute these assumptions.
However, we cannot directly estimate equations (10) either, because the ¯rm
data do not provide skill-speci¯c wages or productivities. For the wages this can
14We use \market" to denote a speci¯c combination of industry sector, region, and skill, as
well as to denote a speci¯c combination of industry sector and region.
30be dealt with by using the worker data. With the Dutch data, we estimate the
wage distribution G of all workers with skill type j in market i (i as before de¯nes
the industry and region) and use the relation between F and G to estimate the
mean of the skill-speci¯c F, for each i;j. In particular, we exploit that






In the Danish data, we observe all workers in the ¯rm, so we can directly quantify
Ek(wijk), which is an advantage over the Dutch data. In both cases we replace
the mean wage costs by the mean gross wage, as the endogenous variable. The
wage costs are the price of labor from the perspective of the employer, whereas
the gross wage is the price of labor from the perspective of the worker.
Concerning the productivity levels, we assume that the productivity pijk of
skill j in ¯rm k in market i can be decomposed as follows,
pijk = p
0
ik + Ãj (12)
where p0
ik is the ¯rm-speci¯c productivity and Ãj is the skill-speci¯c productivity.
Note that the latter is assumed to be the same in all industries and regions. In
fact, we only need an aggregated version of (12),
Ek(pijk) = Ek(p
0
ik) + Ãj (13)







where ¼ij is the fraction of workers with skill j in market i. Note that the left-
hand side and the ¼ij's are observable, while the Ãj's are parameters, and the
Ek(p0
ik) terms are unobserved and potentially di®erent across markets.
By substituting (13) and (14) into equation (10) we obtain
Ek(wijk) = ®0j + ®1jEk(pik) +
X
x6=j
®1j(Ãj ¡ Ãx)¼ix + ®2jwij + ®3j log´ij + "ij
(15)
31for all j. Note that we may normalize Ã1 := 0. For two skill levels, equation (15)
simpli¯es to
Ek(wiuk) = ®0u + ®1uEk(pik) + ®1u(Ãu ¡ Ãs)(1 ¡ ¼i) + ®2uwiu + ®3u log´iu + "iu
(16)
Ek(wisk) = ®0s + ®1sEk(pik) + ®1s(Ãs ¡ Ãu)¼i + ®2swis + ®3s log´is + "is (17)
where subscripts u and s denote low skill and high skill, respectively, and ¼i
denotes the fraction of low skilled workers in market i.
Equation (15) is very similar to (9), the only substantial di®erence being that
the ¼ij's are added as explanatory variables. The parameters of interest are the
®3j's for the di®erent skill levels. An equation-by-equation analysis of identi¯ca-
tion suggests that one needs to have more values of i (i.e., more combinations
of sectors and regions) than skill levels. However, since the Ãj ¡ Ãx parameters
appear in equations for di®erent j, the joint set of equations may have some overi-
dentifying restrictions. This can potentially be used to relax the assumption that
the skill-speci¯c productivity components Ãj are the same sectors and regions.
For example, one may adopt a more °exible factor loading structure.
An alternative motivation for equation (15) is as follows: start with equation
(9), take Ek(wijk) as the endogenous variable, and add the ¼ix as explanatory
variables in the hope that these correct for the e®ects of skill heterogeneity within
market i. This gives an ad hoc interpretation to equation (15). In this case, there
are no cross-equation parameter restrictions. Of course, one may test whether
these restrictions hold.
6 Results for The Netherlands
6.1 Results without skill heterogeneity
We estimated the labor market friction parameters for each market separately,
where we use a non-parametric speci¯cation for G. Most of the estimates of ¸;±
and ´ are in the ranges (0:004;0:02), (0:004;0:006) and (0:20;0:65) per month,
respectively. Table 5 summarizes the estimates in more detail. We ¯nd that the
variance in the friction parameters over regions is somewhat smaller than the
variance over sectors. The di®erence is not very large.
We present plots of the residuals of the estimated friction parameters in Figure
2. When the dots in this picture are on the 45 degrees line, then it indicates a
32¸ ± k ´
Simple means of the raw estimates
Over all markets 0.012 0.005 2.64 0.478
(0.034) (0.0018) (6.83) (0.2949)
Over regions 0.014 0.006 2.73 0.478
(0.010) (0.0003) (1.92) (0.1032)
Over sectors 0.012 0.006 2.50 0.479
(0.012) (0.0009) (2.31) (0.1033)
Means, weighted by market size
Over all markets 0.006 0.005 1.38 0.559
(0.010) (0.0014) (2.08) (0.284)
Over regions 0.006 0.005 1.38 0.559
(0.002) (0.0007) (0.45) (0.1232)
Over sectors 0.006 0.005 1.38 0.559
(0.004) (0.0007) (0.71) (0.1245)
Table 5: Means of the estimated friction parameters (standard deviations of the
distribution of the estimated parameters in parentheses)
33Figure 2: Residual plots of the elapsed job durations, where z = (±+¸F(w))t is the
integrated hazard. Note that over 90% of the observations satisfy the restriction
that the integrated hazard is smaller than 2
good ¯t of the model (Lancaster, 1990). We ¯nd that the deviation with the 45
degrees line is not very large as long as the values of the integrated hazard are
lower than 2. This inequality is true for around 91 percent of the observations.
The deviation with the 45 degrees line becomes substantial for larger values.
Although these observations can be interpreted as outliers, it may also indicate
that (elapsed) job durations are either not exponentially distributed or that there
is a lot of heterogeneity that is ignored in our analysis. Later on we deal with the
second problem.
The estimation results of our original equation are in the ¯rst column of Table
6. The measure of the wage and productivity levels is in hours. The regression
estimate of the frictions indicator is negative as expected, but obviously it is
insigni¯cant. Additionally, we ¯nd that the e®ect of the productivity level is
positive and signi¯cant, though the level of the estimate is low. The e®ect of the
minimum wage is insigni¯cant.
We perform a range of sensitivity analyses. First, we allow for interaction
terms between Ek(pik) and ´i. Secondly, we include higher moments of the distri-
bution of p within markets. Both modi¯cations are supported by the theoretical
model of Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (2000). The ¯rst sensitivity check
is illustrated in the second column of Table 6. We ¯nd that the e®ect of the
34Original Sensitivity analysis
Constant 17.70 20.05 17.31 19.47
(4.15) (4.07) (4.58) (4.69)
Productivity 0.291 0.358 0.337 0.394
(0.045) (0.088) (0.065) (0.108)
Minimum wage 0.258 0.197 0.232 0.211
(0.174) (0.181) (0.205) (0.207)
log´ -0.289 2.92 -0.494 2.43
(0.632) (2.64) (0.748) (2.91)
´(Ek(pik) ¡ w) { -0.151 { -0.137
(0.125) (0.141)
sd(pik)=Ek(pik) { { -9.13 -8.45
(8.16) (7.05)
R2 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.80
Number of observations 66 66 66 66
Table 6: Mean wage regression results without skill heterogeneity
interaction term is negative, but insigni¯cant. The e®ect of log´ turns from a
negative into a positive value, and therefore frictions might either have a positive
or negative e®ect on wages, depending on the value of ´ and the di®erence be-
tween the productivity level and the minimum wage. The third column of Table
6 summarizes the results of the second sensitivity analysis. We ¯nd a negative
impact of the coe±cient of variation on the wages, but the e®ect is insigni¯cant
as well. This goes against the theoretical prediction of Bontemps, Robin and Van
den Berg (2000). The ¯nal column illustrates the results of a combination of both
sensitivity checks. The additional terms are invariably insigni¯cant, and the main
result is not a®ected.
Figure 3 graphically illustrates the relationship between the labor market
frictions and the mean pro¯t margin per sector. This picture shows the relatively
weak evidence for the hypothesis that frictions have a negative impact on the
mean wage.
The results obtained in the previous paragraph could be due to di®erences in
the capital stock of ¯rms. Firms with larger capital stocks need to make bigger
investments in order to keep their stock at the same level. Therefore, the pro-
ductivity level as measured up till now might not be a good indicator of what
is left for workers after costs are deduced from the sales. We do not have any
35Figure 3: Scatter plot of the relationship between Ek(pik) ¡ Ek(wik) and ´i.
information about the capital stock of a ¯rm, but we know the value of the de-
preciation costs. In order to correct for the costs of capital, we run a regression
of productivity on the deprecation costs. We derive the 'alternative' productivity
levels, b pi, from
b pi = b c0 + b " = pi ¡ b c1di
where b c0 and b c1 result from the regression of the deprecation costs, di on the
value added, pi. We expect that b c1 is equal to one, but this does not necessarily
have to hold when ¯rms use di®erent accounting techniques to value their ¯xed
assets or when ¯rms use di®erent techniques to calculate their depreciation costs.
Note that we do not explicitly model the decision process of capital investments
in our analysis. We refer to Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) and Robin and Roux
(1999) for models in which this process is described in a search framework. The
results of the regression are summarized in Table 7. We ¯nd the regressor of the
depreciation costs to be signi¯cantly bigger than one.
Table 8 lists the results using the capital correction term. We ¯nd that the
absolute value of the regressor of the labor market frictions increases sharply, but
it is still insigni¯cant.15
15Note that we did not make the assumption that variance of productivity levels is the same







Standard deviation of regression 30.596











Number of observations 56
Table 8: Mean wage regression results without skill heterogeneity, using capital
correction.
376.2 Results with limited skill heterogeneity
We start with the inclusion of heterogeneity in our analysis by looking at the
data of the Wage and Employment Survey. We use the classi¯cation of workers
in high and low skilled, as discussed in the data section. We use the subscript
s to label parameters that are related to the high skilled workers. Similarly, we
use the subscript u for low skilled workers. Tables 9 and 10 present results of the
means of our estimated values. We ¯nd ¸ to be larger and ± to be lower for high
skilled workers using the means of the raw estimates. The di®erence is not very
large and disappears when we take the market size into account.
Tables 11 and 12 list the estimation results. We ¯nd a positive rather than
a negative e®ect of search frictions on wages. This relationship is signi¯cant for
the high skilled workers. We perform the same sensitivity analyses as in Table 6.
These are listed in columns 2 to 4 in Tables 11 and 12. The relationship between
frictions and o®ered wages is not signi¯cant in most speci¯cations. Hence, the
main result is not a®ected. In addition, we include the frictions indicator for one
skill level into the equation for the other skill level and vice versa. These terms
are insigni¯cant, and again the main result is not a®ected.
The value of Ãs¡Ãu can be derived from dividing the regression estimates of ¼u
(or minus the estimate of 1¡¼u) in the equation for high (low) skilled workers by
the regression estimates of Ek(pik). This provides us with two estimates of Ãs¡Ãu
for any of the model speci¯cations and hence our analysis is overidenti¯ed in that
respect. For example, we ¯nd that Ãs¡Ãu is equal to 33.94 from the ¯rst column
of Table 11. It is equal to 16.58 using the estimates of the ¯rst column of the table
for the low skilled workers. We test whether these estimates signi¯cantly di®er
from each other. These tests are found in Table 13. Although the di®erences in
the values of Ãs ¡ Ãu are substantial, we ¯nd that the t-values do not indicate
that these are signi¯cant.
Table 14 lists the results of the regression of high and low skilled workers using
the capital correction method described earlier in this section. Again, there is no
signi¯cant impact of the search frictions on the o®ered wages.
6.3 Results with detailed skill heterogeneity
As stated before, the Wage and Employment Survey does not contain many
variables on worker characteristics. Therefore, we use the Structure of Earnings
Survey to further investigate the impact of worker heterogeneity. We include two
productivity level on the depreciation costs does not lead to e±cient estimates. Additionally,
the standard errors as presented in Tables 7 and 8 are biased. We do not elaborate on this.
38¸ ± k ´
Simple means of the raw estimates
Over all markets 0.014 0.006 3.04 0.463
(0.024) (0.0024) (5.76) (0.3121)
Over regions 0.014 0.005 3.02 0.458
(0.008) (0.0005) (1.78) (0.1225)
Over sectors 0.013 0.005 2.93 0.459
(0.011) (0.0010) (2.70) (0.1266)
Means, weighted by market size
Over all markets 0.008 0.005 1.89 0.559
(0.010) (0.0016) (2.61) (0.2703)
Over regions 0.008 0.005 1.89 0.559
(0.005) (0.0008) (1.16) (0.1866)
Over sectors 0.008 0.005 1.89 0.559
(0.005) (0.0009) (1.06) (0.1479)
Table 9: Means of the estimated friction parameters for high skilled workers (stan-
dard deviations of the distribution of the estimated parameters in parentheses)
39¸ ± k ´
Simple means of the raw estimates
Over all markets 0.013 0.006 2.94 0.465
(0.026) (0.0021) (6.99) (0.3070)
Over regions 0.014 0.006 3.30 0.459
(0.009) (0.0004) (2.55) (0.1145)
Over sectors 0.013 0.006 2.90 0.457
(0.009) (0.0008) (2.57) (0.1201)
Means, weighted by market size
Over all markets 0.008 0.005 1.84 0.510
(0.013) (0.0014) (3.36) (0.2872)
Over regions 0.008 0.005 1.84 0.510
(0.004) (0.0005) (0.84) (0.1606)
Over sectors 0.008 0.005 1.84 0.510
(0.005) (0.0006) (1.06) (0.1466)
Table 10: Means of the estimated friction parameters for low skilled workers (stan-
dard deviations of the distribution of the estimated parameters in parentheses)
40Original Sensitivity analyses
Constant 17.57 17.56 17.39 17.30 17.54
(5.15) (5.37) (4.57) (4.79) (8.08)
Productivity 0.033 0.032 0.007 0.005 0.032
(0.022) (0.062) (0.085) (0.092) (0.033)
Minimum wage 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.505
(0.225) (0.220) (0.215) (0.215) (0.350)
log´s 5.79 5.79 5.58 5.47 5.81
(2.78) (3.28) (3.00) (1.90) (4.91)
Share of unskilled workers 1.12 1.12 1.26 1.27 1.12
(3.04) (2.97) (0.97) (2.98) (3.05)
´s(Ek(pik) ¡ w) { 0.0005 { -0.006
(0.161) (0.140)
sd(pik)=Ek(pik) { { 5.03 5.06
(15.60) (15.68)
log´u { { { { -0.020
(4.64)
R2 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.72
Number of observations 56 56 56 56 56
Table 11: Mean wage regression results for high skilled workers
41Original Sensitivity analyses
Constant 18.42 17.30 18.41 17.30 18.25
(5.89) (4.12) (3.16) (3.68) (6.72)
Productivity 0.038 0.009 0.037 0.010 0.035
(0.016) (0.047) (0.034) (0.049) (0.023)
Minimum wage 0.077 0.108 0.076 0.109 0.126
(0.206) (0.169) (0.158) (0.049) (0.262)
log´u 3.11 1.74 3.10 1.74 3.01
(2.20) (2.73) (0.59) (1.84) (3.73)
Share of skilled workers -0.63 -1.33 -0.61 -1.35 -1.73
(1.80) (2.41) (1.80) (2.68) (2.42)
´u(Ek(pik) ¡ w) { 0.062 { 0.062 {
(0.107) (0.077)
sd(pik)=Ek(pik) { { 0.267 -0.189
(6.09) (11.89)
log´s { { { { 0.160
(2.25)
R2 0.56 0.58 0.56 0.58 0.56
Number of observations 59 59 59 59 59
Table 12: Mean wage regression results for low skilled workers
Original Sensitivity analyses
T-statistic 0.159 -0.116 0.070 0.025 -0.126
Table 13: T-statistics for the test of equality of the e®ect of the di®erence between






Share of unskilled workers 2.835 ¢
(2.116)
Share of skilled workers ¢ 1.810
(0.786)







Number of observations 43 45
Table 14: Mean wage regression results with skill heterogeneity, using capital
correction.
43main characteristics in our analysis: education level and gender. For the education
level, we use the seven di®erent levels that can be derived from the ¯rst digit of
the International Standard Classi¯cation of Education (ISCED) as summarized
in Table 2. Since there are only a few individuals in manufacturing with a Ph.D.,
we take levels 6 and 7 together.
(P.M.)
7 Results for Denmark
We replicated our main analysis for Denmark. Table 15 summarizes the results
of our estimates of the friction parameters. In contrast to our results for The
Netherlands, we ¯nd that the job o®er arrival rate of employed workers increases
with education level. The job o®er arrival rate is higher for workers with at least
8 years of primary schooling and it stays rather constant for the other education
levels. The job separation rate is the highest for those with exactly 8 years of
primary schooling and it decreases for higher education levels. Compared with
the remainder of Denmark, Copenhagen has low job o®er arrival rates for the
unemployed, while they are high among the employed. The job separation rate is
relatively high in Copenhagen. The construction and the transportation sectors
have relatively high job o®er arrival rates. High job separation rates are found
in the textiles industry as well is in the construction sector and the hotels and
restaurants sector.
Table 16 summarizes the results for the mean wage regression equation for
homogeneous workers (i.e. equal education levels). In contrast with our results
from the Netherlands, we ¯nd a negative and signi¯cant impact of search frictions
on wages. The in°uence is stronger for the equation where we use wage costs
as measured in full time equivalents. The productivity level has a positive and
signi¯cant in°uence on the wage o®er.
Table 17 lists the results for the regression equation with heterogeneous work-
ers. We ¯nd that most education levels (i.e. 7 out of 10) predict a negative and
signi¯cant relationship between wages and search frictions. The relationship is
strongest for individuals with a masters degree. It is insigni¯cantly negative for
the individuals with a public exam and it is insigni¯cantly positive for individ-
uals with a short education or bachelors degree. There is a positive relationship
between wage costs and productivity.
We did some additional analysis for heterogeneous workers. First, we included
gender in the analysis. Second, we looked at di®erent occupation levels. The con-
clusions from these exercises do not deviate substantially from those presented.
44log¸0 log¸ log±
Constant -3.224 -3.411 -5.118
(0.019) (0.027) (0.012)
Education levels
8 years of primary schooling 0.223 0.481 0.153
(0.021) (0.038) (0.017)
9 years of primary schooling 0.295 0.647 0.148
(0.015) (0.030) (0.012)
10 years of primary schooling 0.361 0.666 -0.048
(0.014) (0.027) (0.010)
Highschool 0.216 0.688 -0.254
(0.016) (0.026) (0.011)
Apprenticeship 0.258 0.499 -0.210
(0.012) (0.018) (0.008)
Public exam 0.233 0.769 -0.257
(0.043) (0.070) (0.029)
Short education 0.356 0.828 -0.429
(0.032) (0.072) (0.023)
Bachelors degree 0.289 1.153 -0.479
(0.033) (0.086) (0.024)
Masters degree 0.249 1.114 -0.427
(0.117) (0.216) (0.058)
Table 15: Estimation results for the friction parameters (Denmark).
45log¸0 log¸ log±
Regions
Roskilde 0.085 0.020 -0.097
(0.220) (0.037) (0.013)
Vestj½lland 0.161 0.063 0.087
(0.019) (0.037) (0.015)
Storstrom 0.037 -0.232 0.076
(0.019) (0.030) (0.014)
Fyn -0.087 -0.821 -0.019
(0.036) (0.081) (0.022)
Bornholms 0.075 -0.304 -0.051
(0.017) (0.029) (0.012)
Sonderjylland 0.188 -0.159 -0.300
(0.024) (0.036) (0.015)
Ribe 0.205 -0.089 -0.212
(0.020) (0.048) (0.016)
Vejle 0.179 -0.223 -0.182
(0.017) (0.030) (0.014)
Ringkoping 0.339 0.037 -0.295
(0.023) (0.031) (0.015)
º Arhus 0.088 -0.194 -0.059
(0.014) (0.025) (0.009)
Viborg 0.314 -0.218 -0.201
(0.022) (0.038) (0.015)
Nordjylland 0.007 -0.434 0.088
(0.015) (0.025) (0.010)
Table 15: Estimation results for the friction parameters (Denmark; continued).
46log¸0 log¸ log±
Industries
Textiles, wearing, leather -0.002 -0.195 0.265
(0.031) (0.051) (0.022)
Wood & paper 0.027 -0.056 -0.083
(0.037) (0.063) (0.026)
Publishing -0.079 -0.119 -0.012
(0.026) (0.046) (0.017)
Chemicals, petroleum & rubber 0.092 0.081 -0.032
(0.028) (0.039) (0.019)
Metals 0.096 0.021 0.038
(0.024) (0.046) (0.020)
Machines 0.079 0.067 -0.013
(0.022) (0.031) (0.013)
Cars, trucks etc. 0.094 0.127 0.120
(0.026) (0.050) (0.016)
Furniture 0.144 0.020 -0.012
(0.034) (0.060) (0.024)
Construction 0.333 0.253 0.389
(0.020) (0.026) (0.011)
Trade in cars, etc. 0.213 0.249 -0.142
(0.031) (0.055) (0.019)
Groceries 0.082 0.244 -0.070
(0.021) (0.034) (0.013)
Stores 0.106 0.174 -0.011
(0.021) (0.035) (0.015)
Hotels and restaurants 0.092 0.250 0.334
(0.030) (0.052) (0.021)
Transportation 0.225 0.620 0.054
(0.025) (0.044) (0.015)
Services in transportation 0.173 0.387 0.079
(0.036) (0.063) (0.021)
Real estate 0.070 0.264 -0.187
(0.061) (0.099) (0.036)
Business services 0.132 0.256 -0.112
(0.024) (0.046) (0.018)
Other services (non medical) 0.149 0.059 -0.085
(0.048) (0.114) (0.036)
Log of likelihood = -773480
Table 15: Estimation results for the friction parameters (Denmark; continued).









Number of observations 235 235
Table 16: Mean wage regression results without skill heterogeneity (Denmark).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Constant 230.4 -40.25 -127.3 97.01 -115.8 180.3 914.2 297.2 1165 25.83
(36.11) (225.3) (110.9) (48.91) (55.37) (22.97) (1713) (324.5) (951.2) (8517)
Productivity 0.0846 0.0706 0.0661 0.0844 0.0776 0.0534 0.0849 0.0871 0.0973 0.1446
(0.0259) (0.0204) (0.0216) (0.0213) (0.0251) (0.018) (0.0302) (0.024) (0.0685) (0.0935)
Shares in workforce
Less than 8 years in primary ¢ 349.3 389.5 108.5 250.6 -49.87 -738.5 -158.5 -689.6 -72.22
(253.6) (129.2) (49.27) (55.98) (21.9) (1784) (341.6) (924.3) (8470)
8 years in primary school -262 ¢ -10.76 59.57 -7.79 198.5 -546.4 -354.2 -1230 399.1
(142.8) (179.6) (100.3) (118.9) (82.81) (1632) (303.7) (1188) (8391)
9 years in primary school -259.2 -120.4 ¢ -411 305 -246.9 -1013 -136.3 -968.9 -332.1
(96.93) (276.4) (101.9) (117.1) (56.94) (1740) ( 275) (954.9) (8098)
10 years in primary school -255.4 -56.8 50.49 ¢ 272.9 -94.7 -832.9 -247.6 -1115 -515.8
(54.73) (236.5) ( 146) (70.21) (34.59) (1708) (330.3) (954.9) (8831)
Highschool -291.2 -64.94 39.47 -125.5 ¢ -13.75 -887.2 -182.3 -892.8 -346.5
(40.03) (245.2) (109.9) (63.15) (26.94) (1663) (349.9) (947.1) (8698)
Apprenticeship -106.1 140.4 175.8 -9.652 277.9 ¢ -769.8 -73.33 -686.3 67
(32.92) (226.2) (120.6) (47.39) (52.74) (1692) (328.5) (1004) (8467)
Public exam -525 -295.6 -28.55 -359.3 401.2 -35.52 ¢ 254.7 -181.4 847.8
( 372) (366.8) (328.3) (266.3) (320.5) (242.1) (577.8) (1668) (11440)
Short education 159.2 266.7 405.5 -144.4 101.5 -360.7 -1089 ¢ -685.8 962.9
(179.1) (241.2) (141.9) (141.2) (164.3) (119.6) (2022) (1436) (7155)
Bachelors degree 159.5 259.4 483.1 533.1 832.8 506.2 -662.6 119.7 ¢ 72.89
(179.7) (373.1) (166.8) (138.3) (159.5) (137.6) (2015) (417.5) (9631)
Masters degree -1074 -593.7 -1204 -1083 -307.2 -1555 -725.2 -909.6 -2950 ¢
(673.1) (596.9) (518.1) (536.5) (617.2) (505.8) (2873) (425.6) (3058)
log ´ -25.58 -18.95 -28.93 -22.98 -18.17 -22.72 -8.959 3.282 26.86 -83.05
(7.29) (6.992) (7.952) (9.037) (9.905) (10.75) (12.99) (7.706) (28.03) (41.58)
R2 0.501 0.608 0.631 0.546 0.498 0.518 0.415 0.567 0.378 0.419
Number of observations 193 193 194 194 194 194 168 192 161 77
Table 17: Mean wage regression results with skill heterogeneity (Denmark).
488 Investigation of assortative matching
As set out in Section 1 and Subsection 2.4, models with two sided sorting do not
always agree with our hypothesis that wages decline with search frictions. This
section investigates whether two sided sorting is relevant in the Dutch markets
that we analyze. The most likely form of two sided sorting, and the one that is
discussed most in the literature, is positive assortative matching. This section
investigates the possible existence of positive assortative matching in the Dutch
labor market. In addition, with a positive empirical relation between average skill
level and ¯rm-speci¯c productivity, we make an e®ort to distinguish between an
explanation for this based on two-sided sorting and an explanation based on self-
selection of workers. It should be stressed that the inference in this section is
more speculative than in the rest of the paper, in the sense that we do not aim to
impose the same degree of consistency between theoretical concepts and relations
on the one hand, and empirical speci¯cations on the other.
We emphasize that positive assortative matching is an equilibrium outcome
instead of an assumption in the literature of models with two sided sorting. The
basic result is that positive assortative matching occurs whenever two types (in
our case workers and ¯rms) are complements. We refer to Shimer and Smith
(2000) for a more detailed analysis of this supermodularity assumption. For our
analysis, this implies that high skilled workers are more productive at high pro-
ductive ¯rms than they are at low productive ¯rms. In addition, low skilled
workers may be more productive at high productive ¯rms, but the di®erence
must be lower than the di®erence of high skilled workers. This implies that in our
analysis, in which the workers' and ¯rms' productivity inputs are assumed to be
perfect substitutes, (denoted by Ãj and p0), assortative matching can never be an
equilibrium outcome. In fact, workers will be indi®erent in matching with a low
productive ¯rm or search further for a high productive ¯rm, since they are always
able to bargain over the wage level. We ignore this problem in this section and
focus on the existence of assortative matching from the data, maintaining our
assumption of perfect substitutes. In that sense, we only test whether there is a
possibility for positive assortative matching and this would imply that the model
versions of the previous sections were misspeci¯ed. However, we are not able to
conclude anything from this with respect to its consequences on the relationship
between wages and search frictions.
For our analysis, this implies that high p0
ik ¯rms match with skilled workers.






ik2 = pik1 ¡ pik2 + (Ãs ¡ Ãu)(¼ik1 ¡ ¼ik2) (18)






ik2 = ¯0 + ¯1(¼ik2 ¡ ¼ik1)
This equation states that there is a direct relationship between the ¯rms'
productivity levels and the share of high skilled workers. Positive assortative
matching would imply that ¯1 > 0. Now, substitute this equation into equation
(18). This gives
pik1 ¡ pik2 = ¯0i + (¯1i + Ãs ¡ Ãu)(¼ik2 ¡ ¼ik1) (19)
To test whether ¯1i is positive, we can proceed as follows: we take one ¯rm as
being the k1 ¯rm and the other ¯rms are the k2 ¯rms. This implies that we ob-
serve the di®erence of productivity levels on the right hand side of equation 19.
It is less straightforward to obtain observations of the di®erences in the percent-
age of unskilled workers. This is due to the problem that in most cases only a
few observations of the individual workers in the ¯rm are given. Although this
might bias the results somewhat, we neglect this problem and take the observed
percentages of unskilled workers in the ¯rms' samples as estimates for the total
percentage of low skilled workers. At this stage, the sampling procedure of indi-
viduals in ¯rms, i.e. small ¯rms have to provide information of all their workers,
is somewhat fortunate for our analysis.
The above procedure gives an estimate of ¯1 for each segment i. This says
for each segment to what extent high-skilled workers are at high-productivity
¯rms. This can indicate that we are in a "two-sided sorting model" world with
positive assortative matching (i.e., a demand driven explanation), but it could
also result from ´is < ´iu in an equilibrium search model world, where high-skilled
workers move quickly to high-wage ¯rms which have high p0
ik (i.e., a supply driven
explanation). Note that if the demand driven explanation dominates then this
is di±cult to reconcile with the empirical analyses in the previous sections that
show that frictions have a negative e®ect on wages. This is because we interpret
the latter as evidence that ¯rms are constrained in their labor demand.
In the ¯rst world, positive assortative matching is more likely as equilibrium
outcome if there are few frictions. So the magnitude of ¯1i should be negatively
50Figure 4: Results for the assortative matching analysis, with b ¯1 based on the
estimated value of Ãs¡Ãu for the high skilled individuals and ´ being the overall
labor market frictions
correlated with (the average of) ´is and ´iu. In the second world, positive assor-
tative matching is more likely as equilibrium outcome if there are much fewer
frictions for the high skilled than for the low skilled. So the magnitude of ¯1i
should be negatively correlated with say the di®erence of ´is and ´iu. Note that
the e®ect of the amount of frictions for the low skilled ´iu is particularly infor-
mative on which explanations ¯ts the data best. Stated somewhat informally: if
frictions for the low skilled are low then in a \two-sided sorting model" world
they end up at low-productivity ¯rms whereas in an \equilibrium search" world
they end up at high-productivity ¯rms.
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the relationship between ¯1 and the friction parameter
´. We use the levels of Ãs ¡Ãu using the regression estimates for the high skilled
workers only. Using those of the low skilled workers would not give very di®erent
results, since the estimates of the ¯1's are only linearly dependent on the level
of Ãs ¡ Ãu. Therefore, it would only lead to a horizontal transformation of the
results. From the ¯gures, it is possible to see that there is indeed a negative
relationship. The relationship does not seem to be very strong.
We investigate this relationship somewhat further by using regression anal-
ysis. Table 18 lists the results of this exercise. We ¯nd a signi¯cantly negative
relationship when the friction indices of the homogeneous model are used. There
is no e®ect in the other two cases. (To be completed.)
51Figure 5: Results for the assortative matching analysis, with b ¯1 based on the
estimated value of Ãs ¡ Ãu for the high skilled individuals and ´ being high
skilled labor market frictions
Figure 6: Results for the assortative matching analysis, with b ¯1 based on the
estimated value of Ãs ¡ Ãu for the high skilled individuals and ´ being the low
skilled labor market frictions
52Using estimates of ´ from
Over all High Low
skilled skilled
Constant 0.481 0.513 0.511
(0.037) (0.040) (0.039)
b ¯1(£1000) -0.779 0.297 -0.185
(0.386) (0.410) (0.404)
R2 0.060 0.082 0.033
Number of observations 66 66 66
Table 18: Results of the regression of the measure of frictions ´ on b ¯1 (The
Netherlands).
9 Conclusions
The most fundamental prediction of theories of labor market frictions concerns
the negative e®ect of the degree of frictions on wages. Despite the popularity
of these theories, this has never been tested. In this paper we performed tests
with matched worker-¯rm data. We e®ectively compared di®erent markets with
di®erent degrees of frictions and di®erent market outcomes.
Our results do not support the prediction of a negative relationship between
search frictions and wages in The Netherlands. On the contrary, we found posi-
tive relationships for particular types of workers. There are a number of reasons
for this surprising result. First, the Dutch labor market may not match with the
standard monopsony models described in the literature. These assume either free
entry of ¯rms or make the assumption that ¯rms are always willing to expand
and therefore take on any worker. Models that do not make these asymmetry
assumptions of workers and ¯rms do not necessarily make this prediction. We
investigated this by looking at the possible existence of two-sided sorting. We
found that this may indeed be a possible source of the surprising results found
in our analysis. Therefore, a more elaborate investigation is a good opportunity
for future research. Second, the Dutch data set used in this paper may not be
as accurate as necessary for our empirical analysis. In particular, it contained a
survey of ¯rms about their wage costs and productivity levels. It is quite essential
that these are correct, but especially for the smaller ¯rms, there is no easy way
to check the answers. Third, our estimation techniques may not be as accurate
as necessary to obtain good results. We estimated the friction parameters by us-
53ing the relationship between elapsed job durations and the (relative) wage level
earned in the job. This procedure makes a lot of restrictive assumptions. For ex-
ample, search costs should be equal among all types of workers. This assumption
may have a dramatic impact on the levels of estimated search frictions and hence
on the regression parameters.
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58Appendix 1: Construction of the likelihood con-
tributions from the Danish data
We estimate the friction parameters from the marginal distribution of job and
employment durations, together with the assumption that workers move from
lower to higher paying jobs. In the ¯tted duration distribution we integrate over
the wage distribution. This method has been developed in Koning et al. (2000).
To demonstrate the marginalization that is used, we ¯rst de¯ne zi as the job
leaving rate out of a job with wage wi, which equals
zi = ± + ¸F(wi) (20)
The job leaving rate consists of the layo® rate and the transition intensity to new
jobs. Given the distribution of wi, it is possible to derive the distribution of zi,
the mixture distribution of the hazard of a job duration. We ¯rst derive a general
expression for the mixture distribution of zi:
H(zi) = Pr
¡











Several distributions of (sequences of) wages may prevail. If the distribution of wi
is F, i.e. if the job spell follows an unemployment spell, the c.d.f. and the p.d.f.







zi 2 [±;± + ¸] (22)
Thus zi is uniformly distributed on the interval [±;± + ¸]. Note that the mixture
distribution of zi only depends on ± and ¸, irrespective of any assumed distribu-
tion of p.
If the distribution of wi is G, i.e. if the corresponding job spell is a draw from
the stock distribution of job spells, then the mixture distribution of zi is
H(zi) =






zi 2 [±;± + ¸] (23)
In this case, the mixture distribution of zi is skewed to the left. This stems from
the fact that individuals have less opportunities to ¯nd better paying jobs as
they climb the job ladder. Hence, the average job leaving rate of a cross-section
59of workers is smaller than the average job leaving rate of those workers who start
climbing the job ladder.
We also may observe durations of jobs which are drawn from a °ow sample of
jobs that follow another job. Then, wi+1 is a draw from F, with wi+1 > wi, and







zi+1 2 [±;zi] (24)
Just like in the ¯rst case, zi+1 is uniformly distributed, but now on the interval
[±;zi].
The distributions of multiple job-to-job transitions can be easily derived from






z2 · z1 (25)





z2 · z1 (26)
We are now in the position to derive the likelihood contributions of the em-
ployment and job spells, which is in two steps. First, we derive the likelihood
which is conditional on a particular sequence of values of z, the consecutive job
leaving rates within an employment spell. Next, we integrate with respect to the
mixture distribution of this sequence to obtain the integrated likelihood. The
possible mixture distributions of a sequence of N job leaving rates are as in (25)
and (26).
Our empirical analysis is on a monthly basis. If we observe a worker who is
employed at a particular establishment in year T, then either the establishment
code remains unchanged until the end of the year, T + 12 (i.e. one year later),
or it changes at time t, with T · t · T + 12. The likelihood of the ¯rst event is,
conditional on survival until T, and zi
exp(¡12zi) (27)
The likelihood of a job-to-job transition is, conditional on survival until T,
and the consecutive job leaving rates, zi and zi+1,
60Z T+12
T




[exp(¡12zi+1) ¡ exp(¡12zi)] (28)
Finally, the likelihood of a transition into unemployment, and conditional on
survival until T, is
±
zi ¡ ¸0
[exp(¡12¸0) ¡ exp(¡12zi)] (29)
For each year we know the density of zi, and, if a job-to-job transition occurs,
the joint density of zi and zi+1. The conditional likelihood contributions as in (27)
and (28) can be integrated over the mixture distributions of the (consecutive) job
leaving rates.
As an example, let us consider the case of an individual worker, who is em-
ployed at time T, ¯nds a new job in [T;T + 12], and becomes unemployed in
period t 2 [T + 12;T + 24]. The conditional likelihood of these events is
z1 ¡ ±
(z1 ¡ z2)(z2 ¡ ¸0)
[exp(¡12z2) ¡ exp(¡12z1)] £ [exp(¡12¸0) ¡ exp(¡12z2)] ±
(30)
We integrate the conditional likelihood over the joint density of z1 and z2. This









1(z1 ¡ z2)(z2 ¡ ¸0)
£ [exp(¡12¸0) ¡ exp(¡12z2)] dz2dz1
(31)
Appendix 2: Derivation of the standard devia-
tions of the estimates of ¸ and ±
This appendix illustrates how the standard deviations of ¸ and ± can be derived
when we use the empirical distribution of the observed wages. For convenience,
the analysis presented here is somewhat less complex than is dealt with in our
61particular application. It still captures the main ideas. We deal with the extension
that is used to derive the standard deviations for this paper at the end of the
appendix. For the moment, we assume that observed wages are the o®ered wages
from ¯rms. Additionally, we ignore the problem that the elapsed job duration is
observed only once a year. The log-likelihood contributions are equal to16
logLi = log(± + ¸F(wi)) ¡ (± + ¸F(wi))ti (32)
where t is the observed elapsed job duration of the individual job spell i. We







Since F(w) is consistently estimated by this estimator for any value of w, ¸ and
± are also consistently estimated by using maximum likelihood. The individual
log-likelihood contributions are as de¯ned above. However, the estimation of F(w)
has an in°uence on the asymptotic distribution of these estimators. This problem
can be solved by using the results as discussed by Newey and McFadden (1994)17
(see also Andrews, 1994). Using their analysis, we come to the following theorem































16The complete contribution to the likelihood is logLi = log(± +¸F(wi))¡(± +¸F(wi))ti +
logf(wi), where f(wi) is the density of the wage o®er distribution in wi (or the probability
P(W = wi) when wi is a mass point). However, the latter term does not vary with the structural
parameters of the model.
17In particular, Theorem 8.1, page 2196 of Newey and McFadden deals with this problem.

















log(± + ¸b F(w)) ¡ (± + ¸b F(w))t (36)
where b F = 1 ¡ b F(w) and b F is the empirical distribution of the observed o®ered
wages. Let H¸;± be the matrix of second order derivatives of equation (36) and b H¸;±
a consistent estimate of this matrix. Maximization of this equation with respect to
¸ and ± leads to consistent estimates and
p
n((b ¸;b ±)¡(¸;±)) Ã N(0; b H
¡1
¸;±b ­ b H
¡1
¸;±).







b Ã(wi;ti; b F) + ¯(wi;ti)
´³
b Ã(wi;ti; b F) + ¯(wi;ti)
´T
where Ã is the vector of the ¯rst order derivatives of the log-likelihood contribu-
tions. The hats above Ã and ¯ indicate that we use estimated values of ¸ and
±.
We sketch the proof of theorem 1. According to Newey and McFadden (1994),
we need to ¯nd a function ª such that for k b F ¡ Fk small enough, kÃ(z; b F) ¡
Ã(z;F)¡ª(z;F¡ b F)k · b(z)kb F¡Fk2. For our application, the following function














(± + ¸F(w))2 (39)
63Additionally, for all
° ° °b F ¡ F
° ° ° small enough
R
ª(z; b F¡F)dF(z) =
R
¯(z):db F(z).18
It is possible to show that the function ¯ as de¯ned above satis¯es this equality.
As stated above, we observe a random sample of wages among individuals
instead of a random sample of wages paid by ¯rms. We ¯nd that
± + ¸F(w) = ±
± + ¸
± + ¸G(w)
where G is de¯ned as in the main text of the paper. Substitution of this equation
into the log-likelihood contributions, i.e. the right hand side of equation (32),
leads to




where G is estimated by the empirical distribution. Although the calculus of this
problem is quite complex, the underlying mechanism of deriving the asymptotic
distribution stays the same.19
Simulations using a log normal distribution of the o®ered wages indicate that
the approximation is close even if the number of observation is not extremely
large. Additionally, we ¯nd that the errors that are made by using the inverse
hessian of the log likelihood is quite substantial for the application of this paper.
For example, the estimated standard deviations using the inverse hessian is for
most sectors at least 30% lower than the actual asymptotic standard deviations.
The error that is made in the calculation of the standard deviation of ± is in most
cases much lower.
18The results of Newey and McFadden (1994) are more generally applicable, but this is not
necessary for our application. Note that
R




19Derivations and ¯nal results are provided by the authors upon request.
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